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INTRODUCTION

Recent same-sex marriage cases have generated substantial
debate in legal, political, and social circles; few, however, give
attention to the effect of these cases on legal doctrine itself. As
t Law Clerk to the Honorable Kermit E. Bye, United States Court of Appeals
Judge for the Eighth Circuit; J.D., 2007, Brandeis School of Law at the University of
Louisville; B.A., 2004 Bellarmine University. The views expressed herein are solely
my own and in no way reflect the views of anyone else. I thank my parents for all
they have done for me, without whom none of my accomplishments would have been
possible, Professor Samuel Marcosson for reviewing several drafts of this Article and
providing helpful comments and suggestions, and Michael for his constant support
and endless patience during law school and thereafter. I also thank the staff of the
St. John's Law Review for their tremendous efforts on behalf of this Article.
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scholars, judges, and justices debate the constitutionality of
same-sex marriage prohibitions under the traditional threetiered equal protection analytical model, the cases themselves
should provide substantial impetus to abandon the rigidity of the
current methodology in favor of a more flexible approach that
produces results consistent with constitutional provisions of
equality.
Because plaintiffs routinely challenge same-sex
marriage prohibitions under equality guarantees contained in
state constitutions rather than the federal constitution, state
courts employ different equal protection methodologies to assess
these claims.1 While some of these methodologies mirror those
employed by federal courts assessing claims brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment, some states utilize a contrasting,
unitary standard. By analyzing the varying approaches to this
singular problem, we can make comparative judgments about the
strengths-and
weaknesses-of specific equal protection
doctrines. Comparing the approaches and results of recent samesex marriage cases in Washington, New York, Maryland,
Vermont, and New Jersey reveals that the traditional tiered
analysis contains inherent flaws impeding accomplishment of
equal protection's normative goals. In contrast, the cases show
that a more flexible and unitary doctrine provides the proper
framework for resolving not only same-sex marriage cases, but
all federal and state equal protection cases.
Part I of this Article summarizes the Supreme Court's
traditional tiered doctrine for assessing federal Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection claims. Next, the Article discusses
various criticisms of tiered equal protection analysis as well as
alternative doctrines proposed by Supreme Court Justices and
scholars. Part II will analyze recent same-sex marriage cases in
Washington, New York, and Maryland.
Although involving
challenges based on equality guarantees contained in their
respective state constitutions, Hernandez v. Robles,2 Andersen v.
King County,3 and Conaway v. Deane,4 applied methodologies
mirroring federal equal protection doctrine. The discussion of
1 Because a state constitution's equality guarantee is independent from the
Fourteenth Amendment, states are free to adopt their own analytical model to
assess these claims rather than follow federal doctrine.
2 7 N.Y.3d 338, 855 N.E.2d 1, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770 (2006).
3 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).
4 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007).
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these cases will focus on several flawed aspects of the analyses.
Though many of the problems stem from an erroneous
application of the federal doctrine, some flaws are inherent in the
doctrine itself. While the former set of issues support only a call
for clarity from the Supreme Court and more rigorous analysis in
applying the doctrine, the latter problems demand re-evaluation
of the traditional tiered methodology.
The discussion in Part III focuses on recent same-sex
marriage cases in New Jersey' and Vermont.6 In contrast to the
prior cases, New Jersey and Vermont use a unitary standard to
assess state equal protection claims. This Part will show that
while the unitary standard is furthest from federal doctrine in
form, New Jersey and Vermont provide-in substance-a closer
approximation of the relevant equal protection interests than do
Considering the
states applying a tiered analytical model.
specific issue of same-sex marriage, it becomes evident the
traditional doctrine is flawed in its rigidity and that New Jersey's
and Vermont's standards-or a similar unitary standardprovide a better resolution of the relative interests. This is
because the same-sex marriage cases magnify the contrast
between the different doctrines, a contrast that reveals structural
flaws transcending this specific issue and compelling
modification of federal and state equal protection methodologies
to a unitary standard that eschews rigidity for flexibility.7
Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
7 There are two notable same-sex marriage cases this Article does not discuss
separately from the cases previously mentioned: In re MarriageCases, 183 P.3d 384
(Cal. 2008); and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003). In In re Marriage Cases, the California Supreme Court analyzed whether
same-sex marriage prohibitions violate the California Constitution. 183 P.3d at 44752. With respect to the plaintiffs' equal protection argument, the California Supreme
Court applied a two-tiered approach somewhat analogous to the federal standard
and held classifications on the basis of sexual orientation are subject to strict
scrutiny. Id. at 435-36, 444. The court went on to find denying same-sex couples the
benefits of marriage did not survive strict scrutiny. Id. at 452. In Goodridge, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered whether denying same-sex
couples the opportunity to marry violates state equal protection principles. 798
N.E.2d at 948. Applying an approach mirroring the federal methodology, the court
held discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was subject to rational basis
review. Id. at 960-61. The court then found denying same-sex couples the
opportunity to marry did not survive rational basis review. Id. at 961, 968. Thus,
both California and Massachusetts determined same-sex marriage prohibitions are
unconstitutional under a tiered analysis. Although the holdings of these cases
support this Article's conclusion that the tiered analyses undertaken in Washington,
6
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In addition to highlighting the problems of tiered doctrine,
an analysis of the different models used in New York,
Washington, Maryland, New Jersey, and Vermont provides a
framework for constructing an equal protection methodology that
more appropriately reflects the interests and normative goals of
federal and state constitutional provisions of equality. Thus,
Part IV proposes a modified version of Justice Stevens' unitary
approach to equal protection cases. This standard asks whether
an impartial lawmaker could rationally believe the classification
serves a legitimate public purpose transcending the harm to the
disadvantaged class. In assessing the harm inflicted upon the
disadvantaged class, courts should consider the invidiousness of
the classification and the importance of the right involved.
Relevant to this analysis is the history of discrimination against
the group and whether the group lacks political power. Once a
court assesses the harm to the disadvantaged group, it should
determine whether the public purpose of the discriminatory act
transcends that harm.
In doing so, courts should consider
the importance of the asserted interest and how effectively the
discrimination serves that interest.
This unitary standard
incorporates all relevant equal protection interests while
resolving many criticisms leveled against the current tiered
doctrine.
I.

FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE

A.

Criticisms
Tiered equal protection analysis originated in the famous
footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products Co.' The

New York, and Maryland were deeply flawed, they do not, in themselves,
demonstrate this Article's broader point: Tiered analysis is structurally flawed and
inherently apt to produce erroneous results. This is because the cases reach the
result this Article advocates even using a methodology it criticizes. However, the
cases do not undermine its argument because they show only that tiered analysis is
capable of producing the correct result if applied by judges willing to overlook, or are
not distracted by, its inherent limitations and flaws. Because the goal of any court
should be to produce a methodology that mandates accurate results, and constrains
judges within the relevant interests, the mere possibility of a correct result under
properly-applied tiered analysis does not mitigate the need for a methodology
eliminating the structural flaws particularly apt to cause erroneous analysis.
8 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("[Plrejudice against discrete and insular
minorities... may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").

2008]

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

1413

Court has discerned that "if a law neither burdens a fundamental
right nor targets a suspect class, [it] will uphold the legislative
classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some
legitimate end."9 Where a law burdens a fundamental right or
targets a suspect class, however, "such classifications are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further
compelling governmental interests."' ° Thus far, the Supreme
Court has applied strict scrutiny to laws that classify on the basis
of race," national origin,' 2 and alienage. 3
For quasi-suspect classes like gender or illegitimacy, the
Court uses a form of intermediate scrutiny. 14 To withstand
constitutional challenge, the government must show that these
" 'classification[s] serve[] important governmental objectives and
that the discriminatory means employed are substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives.' "15 The Supreme
Court has identified a number of factors influencing whether a
particular group is a suspect or quasi-suspect class: (1) the
history of discrimination against the group; 6 (2) the political
power of the affected group; 7 (3) whether the trait is
immutable;" and (4) whether the "characteristic frequently bears
no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society." 9
Since the inception of the doctrine, scholars and justices
alike have leveled criticism at various aspects of the tiered
methodology. A frequent target of such criticisms is the Court's
20
criteria for determining which classes obtain suspect status.
First, the indicia for suspect classifications are internally
inconsistent with the doctrine's application. 2 ' While the indicia
9 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
10 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
I1
Id.
12 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
13 Id.

14 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) ("Between these extremes of rational
basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally
has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.").
15 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
16 Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987).
17 Id.

18 Id.

9 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
" Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 503-04
(2004).
21 Id. at 504-05.
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for suspect classifications focus on the vulnerable group, the
appropriate level of scrutiny applies even if the legislation is
aimed at helping this group.2 2 For example, classifications that
burden whites must survive strict scrutiny even though there is
no history of discrimination against whites nor have whites ever
been politically powerless. Ironically, it is the discrimination
whites leveled against minorities and the political power whites
deprived from minorities that rewards them with suspect class
status. A consequence of this inconsistency is even programs
seeking to ameliorate past racial discrimination must satisfy the
same test as those seeking to perpetuate such discrimination.
This irony invites the criticism that "any methodology that
pretends there are no constitutionally relevant differences
between a governmental policy that seeks to perpetuate racial
subordination and one that seeks to ameliorate it is hopelessly
mechanistic and sadly out of touch."23
Others argue, however, strict scrutiny-properly appliedshould pose no bar to remedial race-based measures.2 4 Even so,
the primary problem with utilizing the same level of scrutiny is
the "danger that the fatal language of 'strict scrutiny' will skew
the analysis and place well-crafted benign programs at
unnecessary risk."25
The Court "sends the message to
governments that developing a race-conscious effort to ensure
equality is a high-risk proposition that stands only a limited
chance of surviving legal challenge."2 6
Under the current
doctrine, the liability of government agencies enacting remedial
measures hinges on the ability of reviewing judges to ascertain
and implement the subtle, context-specific analysis of Adarand
Constructors and Grutter. Given the risk-averse nature of many
government agencies, the unpredictability of strict scrutinyeven if properly applied to remedial measures-often dooms
honest legislative attempts to enact legitimate remedial
22 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323-26 (2003) (subjecting affirmative
action programs to strict scrutiny).
23 Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens
and the Case for Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
2339, 2344 (2006).
24 Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1195, 1196 (2002).
2' Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 n.1 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
26 Goldberg, supra note 20, at 510.
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measures." Any doctrine that impedes enactment of legitimate,
carefully-drawn remedial measures is inherently flawed and in
need of refinement.
Another frequent criticism of the Supreme Court's doctrine is
its rigidity.28 The doctrine's rigidity reveals itself in its all-ornothing approach. Unless a class meets the criteria for suspect
or quasi-suspect status, the Court reviews all classifications
Thus, the
under the deferential rational basis standard.29
doctrine recognizes no meaningful difference-at least in formbetween classes meeting many of the traits for heightened
scrutiny (though not enough to warrant heightened scrutiny) and
those that meet none, for both are subject to the same deferential
rational basis review.A° By doing so, the tiered doctrine often
makes the preliminary determination of what level of scrutiny to
apply outcome-determinative. 1
An additional example of the doctrine's rigidity is its
inability to consider the importance of the right involved in
relation to the classification at issue.2 Unless the government
deprives an affected group of a fundamental right, the
discriminatory action has to survive only rational basis review.
3
In such a situation, the right's importance becomes immaterial.
Thus, the doctrine fails to recognize even amongst those rights
that are not fundamental, people place different values on
various rights. 4 Depending on which non-fundamental right is
at issue and what class is affected, classifications can have
varying degrees of injurious purpose and effect. 5 A doctrine that
fails to consider the varying and subtle importance of nonfundamental rights is unnecessarily rigid and inherently flawed.
A final criticism of the federal equal protection doctrine is
the Court's inconsistent application of rational basis review.
Siegel, supra note 23, at 2350.

28 Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the

Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 173-74 (1984).
29 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (describing the circumstances
under which courts are to apply the rational basis standard of review).
30 Shaman, supra note 28, at 173-74.
21 Id. at 173.
32 Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal ProtectionJurisprudence:
Recognizing the Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
1209, 1210-14 (1999).
13 Id. at 1210-11.
" Id. at 1211-14.
35

Id.
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Perhaps in response to the aforementioned criticisms of the
doctrine's rigidity, the Court has in many instances of rational
basis review deviated from its extremely deferential approach in
favor of a more searching judicial inquiry.36 Troubled by the
inconsistency, critics have called for clarity regarding when
"weak" and "strong" forms of rational basis review apply.37 Some
favor resolving this inconsistency by adopting a more rigorous
rational basis review for certain classifications; 38 in contrast,
as a reason to disregard the tiered
others use the inconsistency
39
entirely.
structure
B.

ProposedAlternatives

In light of these criticisms, several scholars and Justices
have proposed alternatives-and refinements-to the current
tiered doctrine.4 ° While there are several competing theories, two
in particular warrant attention: Justice Marshall's sliding scale
approach and Justice Stevens' modified rational basis test.
These two approaches are particularly instructive because they
discuss concepts and address problems that re-occur throughout
many of the proposed alternatives.
Justice Stevens famously began his tenure on the Court by
proclaiming that "[tihere is only one Equal Protection Clause. It
requires every State to govern impartially. It does not direct the
courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a
According to Justice
different standard in other cases." 4 '
Stevens, "the tiered analysis of equal protection claims does not
describe a completely logical method of deciding cases, but rather
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 59-61 (1996). Examples of inconsistent rational basis review include: Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631, 635 (1996); City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 441-43, 450 (1985); and United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-38 (1973). See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d
864, 872 n.5 (Vt. 1999).
3' Goldberg, supra note 20, at 514.
38 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 44 (1972); R.
Randall Kelso, Standardsof Review Under the Equal ProtectionClause and Related
Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The "Base Plus Six" Model
and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 226 (2002).
Goldberg, supra note 20, at 514.
40 Id. at 484; Gunther, supra note 38, at 7; Kelso, supra note 38, at 226; Nice,
supra note 32, at 1215; Siegel, supra note 23, at 2340-42.
41 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
36 See Cass R. Sunstein,
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is a method the Court has employed to explain decisions that
actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent
fashion."4 2 Under Justice Stevens' approach, the Court wouldin all instances-inquire whether there is a rational basis for the
classification at issue.4 3
This is not, however, the deferential rational basis review
that exists under traditional tiered analysis. Rather, Justice
Stevens believes the term rational "includes a requirement that
an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the
classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that
transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged
class."4 ' For Justice Stevens, the sovereign's duty is to govern
impartially, which includes elements of neutrality and
legitimacy.4 5 This approach also considers whether the class
involved has been subject to a history of discrimination and
whether a rational member of the disadvantaged class could ever
approve of the discriminatory classification.4 6
In contrast, Justice Marshall advocated for a sliding scale
approach to equal protection. Through several opinions, Justice
Marshall indicated his disagreement with "the Court's rigidified
approach to equal protection analysis." 47 He believed the Court's
opinions defied categorization into rigid tiers and the Court
applied a spectrum of standards depending on the factual
circumstances of each case.45 In his opinion, the level of scrutiny
should vary based on the "constitutional and societal importance
of the interest adversely affected and the recognized
invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn."49 Justice Marshall's approach focuses on
"the character of the classification in question, the relative
importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of
42 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985)
(alteration omitted) (quoting Craig,429 U.S. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
43 Id.
4 Id.

41 See id. at 453.
4 See id. at 433-55.
47 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); see also Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 432 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
4' San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49 Id. at 99.
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the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the
asserted state interests in support of the classification."5 0
The approaches of Justices Stevens and Marshall both reflect
several of the aforementioned criticisms of traditional tiered
equal protection doctrine. Both eschew rigidity for flexibility in
assessing the relative importance of the interests involved.
Because of that flexibility, both approaches recognize the
substantive differences between legislation designed to
ameliorate past discrimination and those perpetuating such
discrimination. Under either approach, the focus of the analysis
no longer rests on outcome-determinative conclusions regarding
the proper standard of review; instead, the approaches recognize
judicial review of classifications should not hinge on such all-ornothing determinations.
Justice Marshall's standard in
particular stresses that the importance of an interest varies
depending on the group affected and even non-fundamental
rights deserve a sliding scale of protection relative to the
importnace of the right involved.
These theories contain concepts that are crucial in judging
the merits of the different approaches used by New York,
Washington, Maryland, New Jersey, and Vermont in recent
same-sex marriage cases. The failure or success of a particular
analytical model, as judged by its ability to produce results
consistent with principles of equality, lies in its ability to
incorporate these core concepts. While many arguments have
been made that current tiered equal protection doctrine already
embodies many of these principles, the cases show that in
application, tiered analysis inherently blocks consideration of
these crucial factors in a manner that deprives citizens of equal
protection. In contrast, the cases make clear it is through only a
unitary, flexible standard courts can truly consider the relevant
criteria in a uniform manner.

II. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE UNDER TIERED ANALYSIS
A.

Andersen v. King County

In Andersen v. King County,5 1 the Washington Supreme
Court considered whether Washington's Defense of Marriage Act
Dandridge,397 U.S. at 520-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).
50
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("DOMA") violated the privileges and immunities clause of the
Washington State Constitution. 2 In Washington, unless the law
is a grant of positive favoritism to a minority class, courts apply
"the same constitutional analysis under the state constitution's
privileges and immunities clause that is applied under the
federal constitution's equal protection clause."5 3
Thus, the
plurality began its tiered analysis by determining what level of
scrutiny to apply.5 4
The plurality opinion first referenced the factors to
determine whether classifications based on sexual orientation
should be subject to strict scrutiny.5 5 The opinion began by
noting there "is no dispute that gay and lesbian persons have
been discriminated against in the past."5 6 The court held,
however, that the plaintiffs failed to show sexual orientation was
an immutable characteristic.
The court determined a showing
of immutability was required for suspect class status and that
absent such a showing, sexual orientation could not be
considered a suspect classification." The plurality also held that
homosexuals could not satisfy the politically powerless prong
because Washington had recently enacted statutes prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and providing
some economic benefits to same-sex couples. 9 Additionally, the
court noted that several openly gay candidates were elected to
national, state, and local offices in 2004.60 Because the court
believed this was a sign of increasing political power, it concluded
52 Id. at 968. The Washington Supreme Court also held that the act did not
violate the due process clause of the Washington Constitution. As that is not
relevant to the equal protection analysis, this Article omits discussion of the court's
resolution of that issue.
13 Id. at 969.
11 Id. at 973-74.

11 See id. at 974.

Id.
Id. The plurality opinion referenced the Ninth Circuit's decision in High Tech
Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990),
which held that sexual orientation was behavioral and not immutable. Although
that conclusion appeared to be in doubt in Hernandez-Montiel v. Immigration &
Naturalization Service, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled in part on other
grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit has
since approvingly referenced High Tech Gays' holding that homosexuals are not a
suspect class in Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified School District, 324 F.3d 1130, 1137
(9th Cir. 2003).
56

57

58 Andersen, 138 P.3d at 974.
59 Id.
60

Id.
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homosexuals could not satisfy the requirements for suspect class
status.6 1
Next, the Washington Supreme Court ' determined
62
Washington's DOMA did not burden a fundamental right.
Phrasing the issue as whether a fundamental right exists to
marry a person of the same-sex, the court noted there was not a
"tradition or history of same-sex marriage. '63
Because the
plaintiffs did not establish that homosexuals are a suspect class
or that the fundamental right to marry included same-sex
marriage, the court applied rational basis review to the
challenged legislation.6 4 The opinion began its rational basis
review by rejecting the argument that Washington's DOMA was
motivated by animus and therefore unconstitutional under
Romer v. Evans.65 The court held that while some legislators
expressed anti-gay sentiment during the enactment of the
legislation, not all legislators were motivated by such
sentiment.6 6 The opinion concluded Romer applies only if the
court finds the legislation was "motivated solely by animus and
that it lacked any legitimate governmental purpose."6 7 Thus, the
court held the law did not fail rational basis review even though
some legislators were motivated by animus towards gays and
lesbians.6 8
The court accepted the state's argument that Washington
had a legitimate governmental interest in enacting DOMA to
encourage stable relationships that promote procreation. 69 The
court reasoned only opposite-sex couples could procreate without
61

Id. at 974-75.

62 Id. at 979.
6

Id. at 978.

64 Id. at 980.
66 Id. at 980-81. In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court struck down Colorado's
Amendment 2 under rational basis review because "a bare desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."
517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (ellipsis omitted).
6

Andersen, 138 P.3d at 981.

Id. Under the Washington Supreme Court's reading of Romer, animus is
immaterial so long as the legislation has a legitimate governmental purpose. This
misconstrues the holding of Romer and makes animus important only if the law
lacks a legitimate rational basis (at which point the act would fail rational basis
review already). A more accurate reading of Romer is that a law motivated by
animus cannot have a legitimate government interest because it offends principles of
equality.
68 Id. at 981-82.
69 Id.
at 982.
67
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third-party assistance and marriage serves as a mechanism to
provide stability for any resulting children.7" Further, the court
held the Washington Legislature could rationally believe it
preferable for children to be raised by married opposite-sex
parents.7 The court found it immaterial that the state does not
prohibit marriages involving those unwilling or incapable of
procreating given the substantial amount of overinclusion and
underinclusion rational basis review tolerates.7 2 Therefore, the
court determined there was a rational basis to believe that
providing marriage for opposite-sex couples only served the
government's legitimate interest in having children raised in a
stable environment by opposite-sex couples. Thus, the court
concluded Washington's DOMA did not violate the privileges and
immunities clause of the Washington Constitution.
B.

Hernandez v. Robles

In Hernandez v. Robles,73 the New York Court of Appeals74
utilized similar reasoning in assessing the validity of a Domestic
Relations Law that did not provide same-sex couples the right to
marry. Similar to the Washington Constitution, the New York
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause is "no broader in coverage
than the Federal provision."7 5 First, the court determined there
Next, the
was no fundamental right to same-sex marriage.7
court rejected plaintiffs' argument that it should review the
marriage laws under strict scrutiny.7 7 Although the law draws
distinctions based on the sex of the individuals in the
relationship relative to each other, the court found the law
treated both women and men equally; thus, the law did not
warrant heightened scrutiny by engaging in sex-based
classifications.78

70 Id. at 983.

Id.
Id. at 984.
73 7 N.Y.3d 338, 855 N.E.2d 1, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770 (2006).
74 The New York Court of Appeals is the highest state court in New York.
75 Id. at 362, 855 N.E.2d at 9, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 778 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Under 21, Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent Children v. City
of N.Y., 65 N.Y.2d 344, 360 n.6, 482 N.E.2d 1, 8, 492 N.Y.S.2d 522, 529 (1985)).
76 Id. at 363, 855 N.E.2d at 10, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
77 Id. at 363-64, 855 N.E.2d at 10, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
78 Id. at 364, 855 N.E.2d at 10-11, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 779-80.
71
72
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The court agreed, however, that the law draws distinctions
based on an individual's sexual orientation, thus necessitating
consideration of whether sexual orientation is a suspect
classification.7 9 The court noted one of the crucial determinations
in the analysis was whether the groups affected "have
distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has
the authority to implement. ' 0 Without considering whether the
other indicia for heightened scrutiny were present, the court
determined that because the natural ability for opposite-sex
couples to have children is relevant to a governmental interest,
rational basis scrutiny applies when analyzing the challenged
legislation. 81 Oddly, the court noted that when other interests
are affected by classifications based on sexual orientation, it may
adopt a more rigorous level of scrutiny.82
Repeatedly stressing the deference given to the Legislature
under rational basis review, the court concluded New York did
have a legitimate government interest in excluding same-sex
couples from the rights of marriage.8 3 First, the Legislature
could rationally believe marriage exists to promote stability
amongst people capable of having children by accident or
The court reasoned that because same-sex couples
impulse.'
cannot have children by accident, the need for stability in
opposite-sex homes is greater. Second, the court found the
Legislature could rationally believe it better for a child to grow
up with both a mother and a father.8 5 Rejecting the numerous
studies showing no difference between children raised in
opposite-sex homes compared to those raised in single-sex homes,
the court determined "[i]n the absence of conclusive scientific
evidence, the Legislature could rationally proceed on the
commonsense premise that children will do best with a mother
and a father in the home."8 6 Thus, the court concluded the
prohibition of same-sex marriage survived rational basis review
and therefore did not violate New York's equal protection clause.
7'Id. at 364, 855 N.E.2d at 11, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 780.
oId. (quoting City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441
(1985)).
S1 Id. at 364-65, 855 N.E.2d at 11, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 780.
82 Id. at 364, 855 N.E.2d at 11, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 780.
Id. at 361, 855 N.E.2d at 9, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
Id. at 359, 855 N.E.2d at 7, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
85 Id. at 359-60, 855 N.E.2d at 7, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
1 Id. at 360, 855 N.E.2d at 7-8, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 776-77.
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C.

Conaway v. Deane
In Conaway v. Deane,8 7 the Maryland Supreme Court used
much of the same reasoning when holding that statutes
prohibiting same-sex marriage do not violate the equal protection
guarantee implicit in the state's constitution. 8 The court noted
that the state's equal protection clause applies to the same extent
as the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.8 9 The court first determined what level of scrutiny
to apply based on the same criteria identified by the Supreme
Court in applying the Fourteenth Amendment.9 0 The court
began by noting "[h]omosexual persons have been the object of
societal prejudice by private actors as well as by the judicial and
legislative branches of federal and state governments." 91
Additionally, the court determined "[g]ay, lesbian, and bisexual
persons likewise have been subject to unique disabilities not
truly indicative of their abilities to contribute meaningfully to
society."92 Even so, the court focused on recent success in the
executive and legislative branches to eliminate discrimination
against homosexuals, and it was not "persuaded that gay,
lesbian, and bisexual persons are so politically powerless that
they are entitled to 'extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.' ,93 Further, the court determined
it could not take judicial notice of homosexuality as an
immutable trait.9a Thus, the Maryland Supreme Court held
sexual orientation was not a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification.
Because the court also held there was no
fundamental right to same-sex marriage, it applied rational basis
review to the challenged legislation.
Once the Maryland Supreme Court determined rational
basis review was appropriate, it proceeded down the same overtly
932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007).
Id. at 603 n.33. The Maryland Supreme Court also considered whether the
statute draws an impermissible sex-based distinction in violation of the Maryland
Equal Rights Amendment, but concluded it did not. Id. at 602.
89 Id.
at 603 n.33.
90Id. at 606-07.
91Id. at 609.
92 Id.
93Id. at 611 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973)).
94 Id.
at 614. The court stated it could not define homosexuality as immutable
"[iun the absence of some generally accepted scientific conclusion identifying
homosexuality as an immutable characteristic." Id. at 616.
87

88
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deferential path as Washington and New York. The court first
recognized that "safeguarding an environment most conducive to
the stable propagation and continuance of the human race is a
legitimate government interest."9' 5 Rejecting the argument that
excluding homosexuals from marriage in no way undermines or
threatens the ability for heterosexuals to continue to have and
raise children, the court held the link between marriage and
procreation "reasonably could support the definition of marriage
as between a man and a woman only, because it is that
relationship that is capable of producing biological offspring of
both members
(advances
in reproductive
technologies
notwithstanding)." 96 Although acknowledging the merit of the
argument that opposite-sex couples will continue to bring
children into their families through traditional procreation
regardless of the ability for same-sex couples to marry, the court
glossed over this flaw "[i]n light of the deference owed to the
General Assembly under rational basis review.., even though it
may be under- or over-inclusive, or otherwise create a distinction
based on imperfectly drawn criteria."9 7 Therefore, the court held
statutes prohibiting same-sex marriage do not violate the
equality guarantee contained in the Maryland Constitution.
D. The Failureof Tiered Analysis
1.

Analytical Flaws
The Washington Supreme Court, New York Court of
Appeals, and Maryland Supreme Court engaged in a number of
analytical flaws while assessing the constitutional validity of
same-sex marriage prohibitions. Admittedly, some result simply
from misapplication of Supreme Court precedent. While these
may be the product of poor legal analysis in applying the
doctrine, they do not themselves indicate the doctrine is
inherently flawed. More troubling, however, are the errors
resulting from structural defects in the tiered doctrine. Because
these cannot be fixed by refinement or clarification, they compel
the conclusion that courts should abandon tiered analysis
entirely.
9' Id. at 630.
96 Id. at 630-31.
97 Id. at 634.
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To understand the structural errors inherent in traditional
tiered doctrine, it is necessary to elaborate on the analytical
errors that compelled the courts' holdings. In all three cases
applying a tiered methodology, the courts improperly analyzed
whether homosexuals deserve treatment as a suspect class. In
Washington and Maryland, the courts focused their analysis on
the conclusion that homosexuality is not an immutable
characteristic. While there are strong arguments homosexuality
is immutable,98 the troubling aspect of the courts' conclusions is
they make immutability the sine qua non of heightened scrutiny,
which the Supreme Court has never required.
Additionally, the courts in Washington and Maryland
determined that homosexuals were not politically powerless
merely because those states had recently passed antidiscrimination
legislation
affording
some
benefits
to
homosexuals. 99 Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court was
assuaged by the fact that some openly gay candidates were
elected to office during the 2004 election. 10 0 However, the fact
that an affected group is protected by some anti-discrimination
legislation or has a few national political candidates has never
prevented the application of heightened scrutiny. The existence
of anti-discrimination laws prohibiting racial and gender
discrimination in some contexts, as well as the election of female
and minority politicians, never been a bar to the Supreme Court's
continued application of heightened scrutiny to acts that
discriminate on the basis of gender or race. "Indeed, if a group's
current political powerlessness were a prerequisite to a
characteristic's being considered a constitutionally suspect basis
for differential treatment, it would be impossible to justify the
numerous decisions that continue to treat sex, race, and religion
as suspect classifications."1 0 ' Moreover, such conclusions ignore
98 See Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
646, 651-53 (2001) (arguing for a concept of immutability not based on whether a
trait is defined or ingrained at birth and is unchangeable; rather, that immutability
should be understood as encompassing those traits for which change cannot be
brought about by a choice to be made by the individual with the characteristic and
those traits that can be changed by the individual but with only substantial

difficulty or costs).
9 Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 974-75 (Wash. 2006); Conaway, 932
A.2d at 611.
1ooAndersen, 138 P.3d at 974.
101 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (Cal. 2008), reh'g denied, 2008 Cal.
LEXIS 6807, at *1 (Cal. June 4, 2008).
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the fact that these successes-when they exist-are recent, hardfought, narrowly won, and are often times subsequently reversed
through the same political process. 10 2 Both Washington and
Maryland incorrectly concluded that the existence of antidiscrimination legislation and some openly gay political leaders
mitigates the strong history of societal prejudice against
homosexuals and bars heightened scrutiny; in fact, the Supreme
Court has applied heightened review even in the face of such
"signs" of political power.
The New York Court of Appeals also engaged in analytical
flaws when determining whether classifications based on sexual
orientation should be subject to heightened scrutiny. Although
recognizing one of the crucial indicia of a suspect class is whether
the class affected has characteristics that are often relevant to
one's ability to perform or contribute to society, the court
incorrectly applied this standard in an individualized manner.
The court applied rational basis review because it believed sexual
orientation to be relevant in the specific context of marriage.0 3
However, the determination of a trait's relevance should not be
made solely within the confines of the specific case at hand, but
rather in the context of society as a whole. 4 Equally troubling
was the court's determination that in other cases, higher judicial
scrutiny may apply. 10 5 In effect, the court held that because
there is a rational basis to discriminate with respect to marriage,
such discrimination will be reviewed under rational basis
scrutiny. This applies heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation
discrimination only when those classifications are not relevant to
the interest at issue (i.e., those cases that would fail rational
basis review already). Moreover, the New York Court of Appeals

102See Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis?: The Proper
Methodology When Due Process and Equal ProtectionIntersect, 16 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 685, 722-23 (2008) ("Indeed, one logically could conclude that the passage of
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), defining marriage as between a man and a
woman, and the efforts of many states to pass laws limiting marriage to a man and a
woman, are the ultimate evidence of just how politically powerless gays are
throughout the country.").
103 See Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 364, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10, 821 N.Y.S.2d
770, 779 (2006).
104 See Goldberg, supra note 20, at 537.
105 See Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d at 363, 855 N.E.2d at 10, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
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failed even to consider the other indicia the Supreme
Court has
10 6
determinations.
such
to
relevant
identified as
2.

Doctrinal Flaws

Even if courts are correct in concluding a particular class
does not deserve heightened scrutiny, however, the analysis is
still flawed because the doctrine's all-or-nothing approach
prevents courts from giving value to those indicia the class
clearly meets. In all three cases applying a tiered methodology,
once the courts determined sexual orientation failed to meet the
criteria of a suspect classification, it was immaterial to the
remainder of the analyses that homosexuals have endured a long
history of invidious discrimination based on a trait frequently not
relevant to one's ability to perform in society. Despite such
history, classifications based on sexual orientation in
Washington, New York, and Maryland must satisfy the same
standard of review as classifications directed against groups that
have never been discriminated against and possess traits that
are often relevant to societal interests. Thus, all three courts
disregarded the true injurious effect of sexual orientation
discrimination in the name of deference. This is the result of the
doctrine's all-or-nothing approach, and a result that argues
against such a rigid methodology.
Moreover, the courts incorrectly applied rational basis
review to same-sex marriage prohibitions. The cases found that
restricting marriage to heterosexual relationships served a
legitimate government interest in encouraging procreation and
family stability. Although it is certainly true marriage promotes
stability for any resulting children, and that this is a legitimate
government interest, the exclusion of same-sex couples does not
further that interest. When government creates a statutory
scheme excluding certain classes, the government must prove

106 For various arguments concluding sexual orientation should be a suspect

classification under tiered methodology, see Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and
the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 7-10 (1994); In re MarriageCases, 183 P.3d at 44245; Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d at 386-90, 855 N.E.2d at 27-29, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 796-99
(Kaye, C.J., dissenting); Margaret Bichler, Note, Suspicious Closets: Strengthening
the Claim to Suspect Classificationand Same-Sex MarriageRights, 28 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 167, 194-200 (2008); and Jeffrey A. Williams, Re-Orienting the Sex
Discrimination Argument for Gay Rights After Lawrence v. Texas, 14 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 131, 142-49 (2005).
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how the exclusion furthers the state interest. 1 7 By focusing on
marriage's ability to encourage stability, and the need for that
stability in opposite-sex couples because children can result by
accident or impulse, the courts applying tiered analysis did not
analyze how denying same-sex couples the same right furthers
that interest.01 In fact, those arguments apply equally to samesex couples: Same-sex couples have children, and these children
have the same interest in growing up in stable homes. 10 9 While
the government does have a legitimate interest in promoting
familial stability, same-sex marriage prohibitions cannot survive
rational basis review based on this interest because the exclusion
of same-sex couples does not further-and in fact hinders-this
interest.110

107

Dissenting in Hernandez, Chief Judge Kaye stated:

Properly analyzed, equal protection requires that it be the legislated
distinction that furthers a legitimate state interest, not the discriminatory
law itself. Were it otherwise, an irrational or invidious exclusion of a
particular group would be permitted so long as there was an identifiable
group that benefitted from the challenged legislation. In other words, it is
not enough that the State have a legitimate interest in recognizing or
supporting opposite-sex marriages. The relevant question here is whether
there exists a rational basis for excluding same-sex couples from marriage,
and, in fact, whether the State's interests in recognizing or supporting
opposite-sex marriages are rationally furthered by the exclusion.
Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d at 391, 855 N.E.2d at 30, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 799 (Kaye, C.J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted); see generally Samuel Marcosson, The Lesson of the
Same-Sex Marriage Trial: The Importance of Pushing Opponents of Lesbian and Gay
Rights to Their "Second Line of Defense," 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 721, 730
(1997).
10 Even under an overly-deferential rational basis review, numerous jurists
have recognized the state does not further its goal of promoting procreation in
marriage by excluding same-sex couples from the opportunity to marry. Conaway v.
Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 650 (Md. 2007) (Raker, J., concurring in part and dissenting)
(noting the state "cannot rationally claim that its interest in providing a stable
environment for procreation and child rearing is then actually furthered by the
exclusion of same-sex couples from the equal rights and benefits of marriage");
Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d at 391, 855 N.E.2d at 30, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 799 (Kaye, C.J.,
dissenting) ("But while encouraging opposite-sex couples to marry before they have
children is certainly a legitimate interest of the State, the exclusion of gay men and
lesbians from marriage in no way furthers this interest."); Andersen v. King County,
138 P.3d 963, 1017 (Wash. 2006) (Fairhurst, J., dissenting) ("Even if we accept the
proffered interests as legitimate, the plurality and the State fail to address or
explain the issue this case raises, that is, how those interests are furthered by
denying same-sex couples the right that heterosexual couples already enjoy.").
109 Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the
Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981, 991-92 (1991).
110 See Marcosson, supra note 107, at 731.
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Another interest identified by the New York Court of
Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court to justify the
exclusion of same-sex couples from the statutory scheme of
marriage is the belief that the optimal child-rearing environment
includes a home with a father and a mother.11 ' However, this
interest is insufficient for two reasons. First, there has never
been any evidence to demonstrate children raised in same-sex
households suffer adverse developmental or psychological effects
compared to children raised in "traditional" heterosexual
households. 1 12 Second, the states failed to prove how denying
same-sex couples marital benefits furthers this interest. 1 3 There
is no evidence denying same-sex couples marital benefits will
increase the number of children raised by opposite-sex parents." 4
Thus, this interest is insufficient to support the state's
categorical exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage." 5
While one could posit the courts' analytical errors are simply
the product of poor legal analysis, a closer examination reveals
the doctrine itself is inherently flawed in its inability to constrain
judicial analysis within relevant equal protection interests.
Prescient of results like Andersen, Hernandez, and Conaway,
Professor Goldberg has noted that the rational basis standard's
"emphasis on deference at times leads courts to skip over the
required step of evaluating the link between that permissible
The tiered doctrine
goal and the government's action.""1 6
"channels attention away from the particular issues and factual
details of cases and toward general questions about the level of
Because of this, once
scrutiny that should be adopted."' 7
rational basis review applies, tiered methodology gives judges the
.1 See Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d at 359, 855 N.E.2d at 7, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 776;
Andersen, 138 P.3d at 985.
112 See Marcosson, supra note 107, at 731; Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of
Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social Science Perspective, 2 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 191, 196 (1995).

See generally Marcosson, supra note 107, at 731.
Id.; see also Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 963 (Mass.
2003) ("The department has offered no evidence that forbidding marriage to people
of the same sex will increase the number of couples choosing to enter into oppositesex marriages in order to have and raise children. There is thus no rational
relationship between the marriage statute and the Commonwealth's proffered goal
of protecting the 'optimal' child rearing unit.").
11 See Marcosson, supra note 107, at 731.
116 Goldberg, supra note 20, at 490.
113

114

117 Shaman, supra note 28, at 174.
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freedom to gloss over the relevant interest involved in the name
of deference.1 1 This constricts the constitutional analysis and
removes
from consideration
"any number
of factors,
1
circumstances, and consequences that are relevant."' 9 Although
inappropriate deference could be considered simply an analytical
error, the structural flaw of tiered methodology is in crafting a
rational basis review so weak it provides judges the opportunity
to ignore the link between the challenged exclusion and the
legitimate state interest it supposedly furthers. By stressing
deference over substantive analysis, tiered analysis is inherently
apt to produce the analytical errors present in Andersen,
Hernandez, and Conaway.
Additionally, these errors reveal another inherent flaw in the
tiered doctrine: its inability to recognize the spectrum of
importance that society places on non-fundamental rights. So
long as a right is not fundamental, courts utilize the same
standard of review regardless of the right's importance. 120 Thus,
a law that affects one's ability to wear a specific color shirt is
reviewed under the same level of scrutiny as a law that denies
societal recognition of a same-sex couple's commitment and the
resulting economic and personal benefits involved. By granting
such extreme deference to government regardless of the nature of
the right involved, the doctrine avoids a substantive analysis of
the true importance of the right at issue in relation to how the
1 21
deprivation of that right furthers a legitimate state interest.
While deference is appropriate in many situations, courts
should recognize that some rights, though not fundamental, are a
core expression of one's identity and integral to society's
perception of that person, as well as the individual's selfperception. The doctrine's rigidity ignores the reality that a law's
injurious effect is dependent on the right involved.2 2 As the
importance of the right increases, courts need to be more vigilant
in examining the link between the discriminatory exclusion and
the furtherance of a state interest. For homosexuals, same-sex
marriage is not only a battle for societal recognition of their
commitment to each other, but an affirmation of their own
118

Id.

119 Siegel, supra note 23, at 2345.
121

See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
See Nice, supra note 32, at 1211.

122

Id.

120
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equality. "'[D]enying the opportunity to marry to homosexuals is
the most public affront possible to their public equality.' ";123 By
reviewing this harm under the same standard as a government
deprivation of any other right, deference obscures the law's true
effect as class based legislation violating the principles of equal
protection.
The Hernandez court magnified this flaw by holding that the
Legislature could, "[i]n the absence of conclusive scientific
evidence.., rationally proceed on the commonsense premise that
children will do best with a mother and father in the home."124
The court permitted the state-under the guise of deference-to
ignore the majority of scientific evidence proving otherwise to
proceed on "intuition and experience" alone.12 5 While deference
to such unsubstantiated intuition may be appropriate in the vast
majority of cases, it is not appropriate when the result deprives
homosexuals of the principal means for an individual to achieve
societal recognition of his or her commitment to another. A
doctrine that assigns importance to rights within only two
categories, fundamental or non-fundamental, is overly rigid. In
turn, this prevents courts from recognizing the vast and
oftentimes subtle differences in the rights at issue and the need
for government to respond with an interest equally precise and
carefully drawn.
The cases applying tiered methodology illustrate that the
doctrine is structurally flawed in its inherent rigidity. As Justice
Stevens and Justice Marshall enumerated, the doctrine's all-ornothing approach replaces substantive analysis with arbitrary
line-drawing in a manner that fails to recognize the
invidiousness of particular classifications, as well as the
importance of various rights, lie across a spectrum and
governmental interests should respond appropriately. Without a
doctrine that incorporates this flexibility, deference replaces
substantive analysis when laws neither burden a fundamental
right nor target a suspect class.
Because of this, tiered
methodology makes the proper level of review outcome123 Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundationsfor a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage:
Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871, 1933 (1997) (quoting

ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY

179 (Vintage Books 1996) (1995)).
124 Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 360, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8, 821 N.Y.S.2d
770,
777 (2006).
125 Id.
at 359-60, 855 N.E.2d at 7-8, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 776-77.
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determinative, which in turn tethers the analysis to interests and
conclusions unrelated to the principles of constitutional
provisions of equality. The failure of such an approach reveals
itself when the courts in Washington, New York, and Maryland
allow the government to deprive a group that has been subjected
to a history of invidious discrimination of a right central to one's
identity and societal perception based on "intuition alone" and
without sufficiently examining the nexus between the exclusion
and the legitimate state interest. While these same-sex marriage
cases expose the flaws in tiered methodology, the problems
transcend this specific issue and apply to all equal protection
cases. In light of the inherent flaws of the tiered doctrine, it is
necessary to formulate a new equal protection doctrine that
identifies and reflects these core concerns.
III. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE UNDER UNITARY ANALYSIS

A.

Lewis v. Harris

New Jersey does not follow the federal tiered model in
assessing claims brought under the New Jersey Constitution's
equal protection guarantee. The differences are evident in Lewis
v. Harris,2 6 where the New Jersey Supreme Court considered
whether marriage laws excluding same-sex couples violate the
equal protection guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution.'2 7
The New Jersey Supreme Court asks-in every situationwhether legislation distinguishing between two classes of people
bears a substantial relationship to a legitimate governmental
purpose. 2 In doing so, the court weighs three factors: (1) "the
nature of the right at stake"; (2) "the extent to which the
challenged statutory scheme restricts that right"; and (3) "the
public need for the statutory restriction."12 9 Mirroring Justice
Marshall's approach, 130 the court explicitly noted the flexibility of
its test and that "the more personal the right, the greater the
public need must be to justify governmental interference with the
exercise of that right."' 3 '
126
127
128
129

908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
Id. at 212.
Id.
Id.

120 See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.

"I Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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The court began its analysis by detailing the numerous
statutory steps taken by New Jersey to eradicate discrimination
against homosexuals. 13 2 Unlike the analysis in Washington and
Maryland, the existence of such legislation strengthened the
plaintiffs' equal protection claim. 133 According to the New Jersey
Supreme Court, such extensive anti-discriminatory measures
"provide committed same-sex couples with a strong interest in
equality of treatment relative to comparable heterosexual
couples." 34 The court, considering the extent to which the
marriage prohibition restricts the strong interest in equality of
treatment, discussed a litany of rights not afforded to same-sex
couples because of their inability to marry. 13 Specifically, the
court was concerned with the deprivation of rights directed
towards the children of same-sex couples relative to the children
1 36
of opposite-sex married couples.
Finally, the court considered the public need for the
restriction. 137 Unlike Washington, New York, and Maryland,
New Jersey did not assert that the prohibition was necessary to
encourage procreation or to create the optimal living
environment for children. 13 Rather, the state relied on the long
tradition of opposite-sex marriage and its interest in uniformity
with other states' laws. 139 Rejecting both arguments, the court
found no rational basis for excluding same-sex couples from the
rights of marriage. 40 The court reasoned that to the extent
marriage strengthens families and aids children, it does so
equally in heterosexual and homosexual relationships.14 ' While
the court held denying the benefits of marriage to same-sex
couples violates the state's equal protection guarantee, it did not
require New Jersey to grant those benefits via the traditional
marriage statutes. 142 Rather, the court gave New Jersey the
option of amending the marriage statutes to permit same-sex
132 Id.
133 Id.

at 213-15.
at 215.

134

Id.
131 Id. at 215-17.
136 Id. (focusing on survivors' benefits,
obligations as some of benefits of marriage).
137 Id. at 217.
138 Id.

139 Id. at 218.
140 Id. at 218,
141 Id. at 218.
142

Id.

at 224.

220-21.

tuition assistance,

and support
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marriage or to create a parallel system14granting all of the same
rights, though not technically marriage. 1
B.

Baker v. State

Similar to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Supreme
Court of Vermont applied a unitary standard in assessing a
challenge to same-sex marriage prohibitions under the equal
protection guarantee of the Vermont Constitution. 144 Under this
unitary analysis, the first step is to "define that 'part of the
community' disadvantaged by the law." 14 The court then looks to
the government's purpose in drawing the classification and to the
nature of the classification "to determine whether it is reasonably
necessary to accomplish the State's claimed objectives.' 4 6 The
ultimate analysis is whether "the omission of a part of the
community from the benefit, protection and security of the
challenged law bears a reasonable and just relation to the
governmental purpose."14 7 Influencing this determination is the
significance of the benefits not provided, whether the exclusion
promotes the government's stated goals, and "whether the
classification is significantly underinclusive or overinclusive."148
Similar to the courts applying a tiered methodology, the
Supreme Court of Vermont determined that the government has
a legitimate and longstanding interest in promoting a
" Id. Although the New Jersey Supreme Court considered civil unions to be
"equal" to marriage rights, there are very strong arguments that separate is not
equal. Matthew K. Yan, Note, "What's in a Name?": Why the New Jersey Equal
Protection GuaranteeRequires Full Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 17 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 179, 193-97 (2007) (discussing the relevant differences between civil unions
and marriage); see Robert Schwaneberg, Gay Couples Find Obstacles on Benefits,
STAR-LEDGER (New Jersey), Apr. 15, 2007, at 21 (discussing insurance companies
"refusals to provide couples in civil unions with the same health benefits provided to
married couples"). Moreover, there may be an interesting correlation between
doctrinal approaches and remedial orders. The Vermont Supreme Court, also
applying a unitary methodology, gave the Legislature the option of amending the
traditional marriage statutes or creating a parallel scheme of rights. Baker v. State,
744 A.2d 864, 887 (Vt. 1999). It may be the same flexibility in a unitary methodology
that gives courts the freedom to strike down traditional marriage laws in the first
place that allows them to accept such an incomplete remedy; however, with such a
small sampling (two states), it may also be coincidence. Though an interesting and
related issue, it exceeds the scope of this Article.
144 Baker, 744 A.2d at 877-78.
145 Id. at 878.
Id.
147Id. at 878-79.
146

141

Id. at 879.
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149
commitment between couples for the security of their children.
Noting the extensive benefits denied to same-sex couples,
however, the court held that "[t]he legal benefits and protections
flowing from a marriage license are of such significance that any
statutory exclusion must necessarily be grounded on public
concerns of sufficient weight, cogency, and authority that the
justice of the deprivation cannot seriously be questioned. 15 °
Additionally, the court found recent legislative enactments
increasing the rights of homosexuals strengthened the public
policy against excluding homosexuals from the benefits of
marriage.151
With these considerations as a backdrop, the Vermont
Supreme Court held the exclusion of same-sex couples from the
benefits of marriage did not further the government's stated goal
of promoting a commitment between couples for the security of
The court recognized that "[i]f anything, the
children. 52
exclusion of same-sex couples from the legal protections incident
to marriage exposes their children to the precise risks that the
State argues the marriage laws are designed to secure
against."1 5 3 Therefore, the court concluded excluding same-sex
couples from the benefits of marriage violates the equal
protection guarantee of the Vermont Constitution, and it gave
Vermont the option of amending the current statutes to permit
marriage or to create a parallel system granting same-sex
couples all the benefits of marriage.5

Success of UnitaryAnalysis
The contrast in outcomes between states using a tiered
methodology and those using a unitary doctrine begs the
question: Were those divergent outcomes simply the result of
poor legal analysis or were they the product of more substantive
Since the inherent flaws of the
methodological differences?
tiered doctrine are evident-both in general and as applied to
same-sex marriage prohibitions-one must assess whether the
C.

Id. at 881.
Id. at 884.
"I Id. at 884-85 ("In light of these express policy choices, the State's arguments
that Vermont public policy favors opposite-sex over same-sex parents or disfavors
the use of artificial reproductive technologies are patently without substance.").
152 See id. at 882.
153 Id.
154 Id.
at 886-89.
149
150
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standards employed by New Jersey and Vermont address those
flaws in a satisfactory manner that forces courts to conduct the
substantive analysis required by constitutional guarantees of
equality.
First, New Jersey and Vermont, by using a unitary
methodology, were not constrained by arbitrary preliminary
questions regarding what level of scrutiny to apply. Whereas
New York, Washington, and Maryland found the history of
discrimination against homosexuals irrelevant after determining
sexual orientation was not a suspect classification, New Jersey
and Vermont continuously reflected the principle that
classifications on the basis of sexual orientation will merit
vigorous judicial review. 5 5 Appropriately, the existence of antidiscrimination legislation protecting homosexuals strengthened
the equal protection claim in New Jersey and Vermont as a
reflection of the societal goal of eradicating discrimination and
the recognition that sexual orientation
is rarely a characteristic
15 6
relevant to government interests.
This stands in stark contrast to Andersen and Conaway
where the existence of these laws prohibited strict judicial
scrutiny, thereby effectively negating the relevance of the history
of discrimination directed against homosexuals.'5 7 In contrast,
the unitary methodologies employed by New Jersey and Vermont
recognize that recent anti-discrimination legislation reflects this
long history of discrimination and is symbolic of society's
intolerance of such classifications. 58
Instead of using antidiscrimination statutes as a basis to replace thorough analysis
with deference, New Jersey and Vermont recognize them as a
reason to doubt the legitimacy of any future sexual orientation
classifications.
This ability to conduct a more substantive review flows from
the doctrine's flexibility in assessing the character of the group
affected and the nature of the right involved. While Washington,
New York, and Maryland relegate marriage's importance to
trivial status after determining same-sex marriage is not a
fundamental right, the unitary standard's flexibility compels a
See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 215 (N.J. 2006); Baker, 744 A.2d at 885.
Lewis, 908 A.2d at 215; Baker, 744 A.2d at 885.
157 See Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 973-75 (Wash. 2006); Conaway
v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 611 (Md. 2007).
155
156

15' Lewis, 908 A.2d at 213-14.
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court to conduct a meaningful analysis of the importance of
marriage as it relates to the affected class. Applied in New
Jersey and Vermont, this allowed the courts to consider the
extensive benefits involved in marriage and the effect a lack of
marital benefits has on same-sex couples and their children. The
doctrine's flexibility allows courts to recognize this reality and
thus require a stronger governmental interest than might be
applicable in other situations. By requiring a stronger interest,
the test mandates a more substantive analysis that compels
conclusions consistent with constitutional guarantees of equality,
whether federal or state. This stands in stark contrast to the
rigidity of the tiered structure, which mandates a level of
rational basis review apparently so deferential that legislators
can enact discriminatory laws based on unsubstantiated
"intuition and experience."
Fortunately, these concerns have not gone completely
unnoticed by the Supreme Court. In Plyler v. Doe,6 9 the Court
considered whether a Texas law denying public education to the
°
children of illegal aliens violates the Equal Protection Clause.16
16
'
right.
fundamental
a
not
is
education
that
First, the Court held
Additionally, the Court concluded illegal aliens are not a suspect
Under traditional tiered analysis, as the dissent
class.162
illustrated, the Court should have applied rational basis review
and found the law constitutional.' 6 3 However, understanding the
inherent rigidity of the tiered doctrine and the inappropriate
level of deference accompanying rational basis review, the Court
realized that "more is involved in these cases than the abstract
question whether [the statute] discriminates against a suspect
class, or whether education is a fundamental right."'6 4
While the Court concluded education is not a fundamental
right, "neither is it merely some governmental 'benefit'
forms of social welfare
from other
indistinguishable
159

457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982).

160

Id. at 205.

161 Id. at 221.
162

Id. at 219 n.19.

16 Id. at 244, 248 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Once it is conceded-as the Court
does-that illegal aliens are not a suspect class, and that education is not a
fundamental right, our inquiry should focus on and be limited to whether the
legislative classification at issue bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose.").
164Id. at 223 (majority opinion).
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legislation.' 16 5 Moreover, the Court noted that denying education
to this isolated group of children violates one of the central tenets
of the Equal Protection Clause: "the abolition of governmental
barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on
the basis of individual merit."166 In light of these concerns, the
Court held the legislation could only be rational if it furthered a
substantial goal of the state.16 7 By requiring this higher level
the law
of scrutiny, the Court was able to recognize that
8
accomplished none of the goals set out by the state.16
Plyler's significance rests on the Court's recognition of a
crucial fact: Strict reliance on tiered doctrine, at least in some
cases, impedes full analysis of appropriate equal protection
interests. The dissent, chained to the rigidity of tiered doctrine,
was incapable of assessing the senselessness of the state law at
issue.16 9 Because it would have applied overly deferential
rational basis review, the dissent-under the guise of deferencewould have overlooked the reality that the law served none of the
state's articulated goals. 7 0 In contrast, "[t]he majority opinion in
the case was able to reveal this senselessness and therefore
strike down the law by adopting an approach similar to the
unitary framework.' 7 ' By rejecting the categorical rigidity of
tiered methodology, the majority engaged in an in-depth analysis
of the interests involved, the classification at issue, and the
relationship between the interest and the group affected. This
unitary, more flexible standard allowed the Court to engage in a
deeper analysis than tiered methodology permits. This case
illustrates what recent same-sex marriage cases make apparent:
Tiered analysis impedes appropriate consideration of relevant
equal protection interests.
The Court's opinion in Romer v. Evans 72 further illustrates
this point. In Romer, the Court considered whether Colorado's
Amendment 2, which prohibited any government action designed
73
to protect homosexuals, violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
at 221.
Id. at 221-22.
Id. at 224.
Shaman, supra note 28, at 179-80.
Id. at 180.

165 Id.
166

167
168
169

170 Id. at 179-80.
171 Id. at
172
173

180.
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Id. at 624.
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The Court applied rational basis review 174 and held that because
the amendment was motivated by animus towards homosexuals,
the government did not have a legitimate interest in enacting the
amendment. 17 5 Similar to Plyler, the dissent would have relied
on the overtly deferential nature of rational basis review to
uphold the challenged classification. 17 6 Though more subtle than
Plyler, the Court in Romer recognized the need to depart from
traditional rational basis review to analyze the importance of the
right involved and the illegitimate motive behind the
classification at issue. 77 Although Amendment 2 did not involve
a fundamental right, the Court was concerned that "[t]he
resulting disqualification of a class of persons from the right to
seek specific protection from the law [was] unprecedented in [the
Court's] jurisprudence."7 8 Recognizing the "severe consequence"
of Amendment 2,179 the Court deviated from the deference
normally accompanying rational basis review."18 Only through a
deeper analysis could the majority recognize what the dissent
was incapable of comprehending: that Amendment 2 was the
type of class-based legislation antithetical to the Fourteenth
Amendment.
As both Plyler and Romer illustrate, rigid
adherence to traditional tiered doctrine often impedes judicial
analysis of discriminatory classifications.8
As the cases in Washington, New York, and Maryland
demonstrate, the issue of same-sex marriage reveals the same
analytical problems with tiered analysis that concerned the
Court in Plyler and Romer. Similar to education, the right for
same-sex couples to marry, even if not fundamental, is not
"merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other
forms of social welfare legislation."18 2 Aside from the numerous
114 Id.
at 631-32. The court did not determine whether homosexuals are a
suspect class. Because the Court held that Amendment 2 did not pass rational basis
review, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether a higher level of
scrutiny may apply. See id. at 631-32, 635.
17 Id. at 632.

176 Id. at 640.
177

178
171

Todd M. Hughes, Making Romer Work, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 169, 175 (1997).
Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
Id. at 629.

180 Sunstein, supra note 36, at 53.
'81 Professor Sunstein noted after Romer that "[t]he hard edges of the tripartite
division have thus softened, and there has been at least a modest convergence away
from tiers and toward general balancing of relevant interests." Id. at 77.
182 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
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tangible benefits available to married couples, the right to marry
is inextricably linked with one's conception of human dignity and
autonomy.1 3 Marriage involves personal confirmation of a
couple's commitment to each other while also acting as the
means to achieve societal recognition of that commitment.
Because of the unique nature of the right, tiered analysis is
incapable of assessing a state's deprivation of that right; thus,
the courts applying a tiered methodology relied on an
inappropriate amount of deference to avoid scrutinizing the
legitimate government interest and how the discriminatory
exclusion furthers that interest. While the Supreme Court was
able to recognize the doctrine's shortcomings in Plyer and Romer
and modify the analysis accordingly, lower courts, including state
courts following the federal model, too often ignore or fail to
appreciate these variations in favor of rigid classifications and
inappropriate deference. Such failures result from more than
poor legal analysis, they flow directly from the doctrine itself.
The cases in Washington, New York, and Maryland
demonstrate how such an approach leads to conclusions
inconsistent with the normative goals of constitutional
guarantees of equality. In contrast, it was only through unitary
methodologies that New Jersey and Vermont were able to avoid
rigid categorization of classifications, interests, and rights to
reveal the senselessness of the law at issue. These cases reveal
that for same-sex marriage cases, similar to Plyler, only a unitary
standard can constrain judicial analysis within relevant equal
protection interests and force a more penetrating inquiry
regarding the nature of the right involved, its relationship to the
group deprived of that right, and how the discrimination furthers
a governmental interest.1 8 4 These lessons, however, transcend
the specific issue of same-sex marriage and demonstrate the need
for unitary analysis of all federal and state equal protection
claims. The question becomes: How should courts structure a
unitary methodology to capture the benefits of a unitary
approach and eliminate the flaws of tiered methodology?

"s Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 215 (2006).
See Shaman, supra note 28, at 180-81.

114
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IV. A BETTER WAY
While many scholars, judges, and Justices are in accord with
the need to adopt a unitary model, they often disagree when
deciding the form of such an analytical model. 8 5 However, many
of the approaches generally focus on balancing two
considerations: the governmental interest involved and the harm
inflicted by the classification.
To combine these interests
appropriately, while also integrating the proper amount of
deference, federal and state courts should mirror Justice Stevens'
approach and ask whether an impartial lawmaker could
rationally believe the classification serves a legitimate public
purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the
disadvantaged class. This Articles argues that this standard
incorporates all relevant considerations of equal protection
analysis.
The crux of this analysis is on the harm to the disadvantaged
class.
Determining the harm of the classification requires
consideration of two elements: (1) the invidiousness of the
classification; and (2) the nature of the right at stake. 8 6 As the
invidiousness of the classification and the importance of the right
increase, the governmental interest must proportionally increase
for it to transcend the harm of the discriminatory law. While this
analytical approach is different in form than the tiered doctrine,
the unitary standard still incorporates many of the previously
relevant concepts. As the standard focuses on an impartial
lawmaker, any classification motivated by animus would fail,
because the existence of animus precludes a lawmaker's
impartiality. Thus, under the Court's application of the tiered
doctrine in Romer and the modified version of Justice Stevens'
unitary standard proposed here, animus towards politically
unpopular groups would doom discriminatory classifications.18 7
Additionally, many of the factors relevant in determining
whether a group is a suspect class will still be relevant in
185See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State Constitutional
Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1013, 1032 (2003), for a summary of various unitary
approaches under state constitutions. Compare Goldberg, supra note 20, with John
Marquez Lundin, Making Equal Protection Analysis Make Sense, 49 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1191 (1999), for a sampling of the rich literature on this subject, in addition to
the approaches of Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens.
"8 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment:
The Unfulfilled Promise, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1143, 1154 (1992).
187 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).

1442

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1409

assessing the invidiousness of a classification. Primarily, the
invidiousness of a classification depends on the strength of two
considerations: a history of discrimination against the group and
its lack of political power. The former is particularly important
"blecause prejudice spawns prejudice, and stereotypes produce
limitations that confirm the stereotype on which they are based"
and as a result, "a history of unequal treatment requires
sensitivity to the prospect that its vestiges endure." 88
Any
classification that perpetuates a history of unequal treatment is
more likely to inflict harm than classifications that disadvantage
18 9
groups historically free from such prejudicial treatment.
The second consideration-a group's lack of political poweris relevant because groups lacking political power are more in
need of "protection from the majoritarian political process."190
Theoretically, groups who possess sufficient political power can
effectively redress their grievances through the political process.
Thus, classifications disadvantaging those groups are more likely
to be the product of reasoned consideration.
In contrast,
classifications that disadvantage politically powerless groups are
more apt to result from a blatant disregard of the group excluded,
thus violating one of equal protection's normative goals.
However, courts should analyze both of these considerations
independently. Unlike tiered analysis, this should not be an allor-nothing approach that a group either meets or does not meet,
for the lack of one relevant criterion (e.g., history of
discrimination) should not preclude consideration of the other.
In contrast to a tiered methodology, these factors would be a
flexible barometer for assessing the invidiousness of a particular
classification, not a rigid test for which the failure to meet one
criteria would negate consideration of others and obviate the
need for a governmental interest sufficiently furthered by the
discriminatory act.
Notably absent from consideration are two criteria the Court
currently uses to gauge whether a group is a suspect class:
immutability and whether the group has characteristics often
relevant to disparate treatment.
Though the Court has

188

City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472 n.24

(Marshall, J., dissenting).
189 See N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 (1979).
190 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
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historically found immutability relevant,1 9 ' its importance has
waned in recent times. 92
Possibly, the Court may have
recognized that the "importance accorded to immutability as an
indicia of suspectness runs contrary to the Court's own
recognition that society, not nature, gives many traits their
significance.' 9 3 Thus, many scholars reject immutability as a
relevant characteristic; 194 in contrast, Professor Marcosson
argues that a properly redefined immutability-one that
incorporates immutability as a product of social constructionshould remain relevant. 195
However, even a redefined
immutability is not a particularly helpful barometer in assessing
the harm a discriminatory classification inflicts on a
disadvantaged group. 196 Many classifications discriminating with
respect to immutable characteristics (e.g., intelligence, age)
inflict minimal constitutional harm. Thus, immutability should
not be considered in this redefined unitary doctrine.19 7
Additionally, the proposed standard finds no relevance in
whether the disadvantaged group has characteristics that are
often relevant to valid classifications. While the relevance of the
particular characteristic at issue in any one case is significant,
there is no reason to skew the analysis because the group has
characteristics that may be relevant in other contexts. Because
"a characteristic may be relevant under some or even many
circumstances does not suggest any reason to presume it relevant
under other circumstances where there is reason to suspect it is
not." 198 Because this standard forces a substantive analysis of

See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987).
Marcosson, supra note 98, at 647.
19 Goldberg, supra note 20, at 506.
191
192

194

Id.; see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW 150 (1980); E. Gary Spitko, A Biologic Argument for Gay Essentialism-

Determinism: Implicationsfor Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process, 18 U.
HAW. L. REV. 571, 598 (1996).
195 Marcosson, supra note 98, at 650.

See Sunstein, supra note 106, at 9 (noting that immutability is often
irrelevant in determining which classifications rest on illegitimate grounds).
197Even if a court did find immutability relevant to an equal protection
analysis, it should not be applied as a prerequisite, as the courts did in Andersen and
Conaway, for meaningful judicial scrutiny, but rather as one of many factors in
determining the invidiousness of a classification.
198City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 468-69 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("A sign that says 'men only'
looks very different on a bathroom door than a courthouse door."); cf Goldberg,
196
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the interest involved regardless of the classification, there is no
reason to utilize presumptions based on a characteristic's
relevance in other contexts.
The second judicial consideration in assessing the harm of a
discriminatory classification is the nature of the right at stake.
This consideration increases with the importance of the right at
issue. Instead of arbitrarily categorizing rights as fundamental
or non-fundamental, courts should recognize that rights have
different degrees of importance.
Courts should require the
strength of the governmental interest to vary "with 'the
constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely
affected.' "199 More importantly, the importance of the right must
be understood with reference to the group affected. 200 As the
importance of a right can vary in the abstract sense, so too can
its importance vary depending on which group is disadvantaged.
This principle "recognizes the interdependence, rather than the
separation and isolation, of rights and the classes of right-holders
and non-right-holders." 21 Depriving a group of a right can have
varying degrees of injurious purpose and effect based solely on
which group is affected. As the value of the right increases, both
in the abstract and as related to the particular group at issue,
the harm of the discriminatory classification increases.
This standard forces courts to begin their equal protection
analysis by assessing the harm of the discriminatory
classification on the group affected. This requires an assessment
of both the invidiousness of the classification and the value of the
right at issue. By its structure, this unitary standard responds to
many of the criticisms of the tiered doctrine.
Namely, by
abandoning the rigidity of tiers, the standard recognizes-and
allows courts to consider-the differences between legislation
that perpetuates discrimination and those aimed at remedying
such discrimination. By gauging the invidiousness of the statute
based on the disadvantaged group, as opposed to the
classification itself, courts can recognize that affirmative action
programs inflict less constitutional harm than many other forms

supra note 20, at 537 ("[Slkeptical scrutiny will not follow if the trait plausibly can
be the basis for differential treatment in a variety of contexts.").
199 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973)).
200 Nice, supra note 32, at 1223.
201 Id. at 1223-24.
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of discrimination.
Because these programs by definition
disadvantage majority groups, there will be no history of
discrimination against the affected group, nor will that group
lack political power. Thus, the proposed standard will treat
these classifications as inflicting minimal constitutional harm,
thereby decreasing the strength of the state interest required.
Second, the proposed standard is more capable of assessing
situations in which several different classifications, and rights,
intersect. °2 In such a situation, the standard would evaluate the
harm of each classification and right involved and then require a
public interest significant enough to transcend the totality of the
harm inflicted on the disadvantaged groups.
After determining the magnitude of the harm, courts should
ask whether the law serves a public interest that transcends this
harm. In essence, this requires courts to consider two separate
yet related points: the strength of the interest and how well the
classification serves that interest.
Instead of determining
whether an interest meets an arbitrary standard (e.g.,
compelling, substantial, or legitimate), courts must determine
whether it outweighs the harm inflicted on the disadvantaged
group. Though the inquiry is different, the history of Supreme
Court cases under the traditional approach would continue to
provide guidance as to the relative merits of particular
governmental interests. Moreover, under- and over-inclusion
remain relevant under this unitary standard.
Because this
analysis considers how well the classification serves the relied
upon interest, substantial overinclusion and underinclusion
impedes the interest from transcending the inflicted harm.
By assessing claims under this standard, courts come closer
to analyzing discriminatory classifications in light of the
Fourteenth Amendment's normative goals.
Further, this
standard requires courts to identify the rights and interests

202 Lundin, supra note

185, at 1233. It is unclear exactly how the tiered

approach would treat government actions that discriminate on the basis of multiple
classifications involving different levels of review. For example, what level of
scrutiny would a court use against a statute that discriminates against disabled
women? Plausibly, one could argue for rational basis (disability), intermediate
scrutiny (gender), or even strict scrutiny because of the synergy of the classifications.
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 431 (1998), presents a stark example of such a
classification.
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involved in the classification in a careful and explicit manner. °3
The proposed doctrine forces courts to engage in a more
substantive analysis of the relevant considerations in a manner
that fosters accurate resolution of the competing interests.
CONCLUSION

By examining the application of different equal protection
methodologies in assessing the constitutional validity of same-sex
marriage prohibitions, it becomes evident the traditional tiered
approach is inherently flawed and needs to be replaced with a
unitary standard that eschews an overly rigid approach to
categorizing the classes affected and the rights at issue.
Hernandez, Andersen, and Conaway, revealed and magnified the
flawed rigidity of the tiered doctrine. In contrast, Lewis and
Baker show that by adopting a more flexible approach, courts can
more readily recognize the importance of marriage to
homosexuals and how that right relates to the history of
discrimination against homosexuals.
While the same-sex
marriage cases demonstrate and magnify the need for a more
flexible unitary standard, such a standard should be applied in
all equal protection cases, whether brought under federal or state
constitutions.
In essence, courts should ask whether an
impartial
lawmaker could rationally believe that the
classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that
transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class.
In assessing the harm to the disadvantaged class, courts should
consider the invidiousness of the classification and the
importance of the right involved. Against this, courts should
balance the importance of the governmental interest and how
effectively the classification serves that interest. This unitary
standard abandons the current rigidity of tiered analysis and
forces courts to conduct a thorough assessment of all relevant
equal protection interests.

..
3 See Peter S. Smith, The Demise of Three-Tier Review: Has the United States
Supreme Court Adopted a "Sliding Scale" Approach Toward Equal Protection
Jurisprudence?,23 J. CONTEMP. L. 475, 488 (1997).

